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ANALYSIS OF NONTRADITIONAL CONTRACTORS AS A PROXY 
FOR INNOVATION THROUGH DOD OTHER TRANSACTION 
AGREEMENTS 
ABSTRACT 
 The 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the critical importance of 
leveraging technological advancements in a world with rapidly growing security 
concerns. For the Department of Defense (DoD) to integrate advancements into military 
capabilities, the acquisition community will need to innovate its business practices to 
support the changing character of war. Other Transactions (OTs) provide a tool that 
offers the flexibility to incorporate business methods similar to commercial industry best 
practices, thereby supporting faster design and execution. The recent increased use of 
OTs in federal contracting for research and prototype projects also incentivizes 
nontraditional defense contractors (NDCs), who would not otherwise overcome obstacles 
inherent in traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation contracting, to contract with the 
DoD and serve as proxies to innovation. Three primary techniques are employed. First, a 
spend analysis is performed on Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation data. 
Second, consortium data is matched with the System for Award Management Application 
Programming Interface to assess the proposed scale using psychometric techniques. Last, 
a logit model estimates the predictive power of the proposed scale and the relationships 
between the variables and the current NDC statutory classification. Understanding the 
characteristics of OT NDCs will help the DoD leverage acquisition policy decisions to 
access emerging technology solutions. 
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The 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the critical importance of 
leveraging technological advancements in a world with rapidly growing security concerns. 
For the Department of Defense (DoD) to integrate advancements into military capabilities, 
the acquisition community will need to innovate its business practices to support the 
changing character of war. Other Transactions (OTs) provide a nontraditional tool that 
offers the flexibility to incorporate business methods similar to commercial industry best 
practices, thereby supporting faster design and execution. The recent increased use of OTs 
in federal contracting for research, prototype, and production projects also incentivizes 
nontraditional defense contractors (NDCs), who would not otherwise overcome obstacles 
inherent in traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation contracting, to contract with the DoD 
and serve as proxies to innovation.  
This research investigates whether the alternative metrics of distance to the nearest 
tech-hub, membership in a consortium, total DoD obligations, and compound annual 
growth measure the innovative potential of NDCs and have predictive power for 
classifying firms under the current binary NDC construct. The research questions provide 
a narrow view of OT use, however, contribute to the larger scale critical question of 
whether OTs provide an advantage to innovative technological advancements through 
NDCs. In addition, this research is an initial step in determining best methods and 
incentives to encourage NDCs to work with the DoD, since future decisions cannot be 
made without a clear understanding of the current industrial base for OT agreements. This 
study integrates data from multiple sources to employ techniques for analysis of innovative 
potential. The first research objective is to investigate alternative metrics to measure the 
innovative potential of NDCs through OT agreements. This is conducted through a logit 
model that empirically tests a multi-item scale that measures the innovative potential of 
firms and assesses the predictive power for classifying firms under the current binary NDC 
classification. The logistic regression of nontraditional status on the four dependent 
variables (distance to a tech-hub, consortium membership, CAGR, and total obligations) 
fit significantly better to the data than a null model 𝜒𝜒2(4) = 32.01,𝑝𝑝 <  .01) and correctly 
xvi 
predicted nontraditional status for 79.6% of vendors based off pseudo R. The second 
research objective is to examine NDCs through a spend analysis of archival Federal 
Procurement Data System Next Generation data. The DoD’s OT use has increased 
significantly with the expanded authorities. One of congress’s primary objectives in 
allowing acquisition flexibility through OTs is to attract NDCs as a proxy for innovative 
weapons systems.  
Understanding the structure and characteristics of OT NDCs will help the DoD in 
leveraging acquisition policy decisions to access emerging technology solutions. Some 
areas for future research include researching different metrics for innovative potential, the 
benefits of OT agreements versus other nontraditional contracting methods through 
successful prototyping, and analysis of weapon system programs resulting from awards to 
consortiums. Congress has increased reporting and notification requirements in the 
FY2019 defense authorization and appropriations legislation; therefore, more data and 
information will be publicly available for research, which will allow for more in-depth 
research and understanding of the utilization of OT agreements and access to NDCs. Being 
able to measure and quantify the innovative potential of firms will help the DoD to access 
innovation for research and prototyping by being able to tailor the OT special authority 
towards those firms that might otherwise not partner with the DoD.    
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Department of Defense is now in a period during which the time a 
particular technology is a dominant force on the battlefield is getting 
increasingly shorter, disruptive technologies are emerging at a faster pace, 
and these technologies are more widely dispersed. … In a world with 
rapidly changing technology, time is a valuable resource that must not be 
taken for granted. It is difficult to predict what capabilities the DoD will 
need 5 to 10 years from now—biotechnology, nanotechnology, artificial 
intelligence, robotics, or a new technology area not even known today. It 
also is unclear on what plane the military will conduct warfare—traditional 
battlefields, space, cyberspace, or some other domain. The current 
acquisition system lacks the agility needed to adapt to new paradigms. 
—Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations 
(2017, p. 7) 
Until recently, the U.S. military has defended unmatched superiority in all 
domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. With the “rapid technological 
advancements and the changing character of war,” the strategic environment requires the 
United States to rapidly advance, especially due to “the fact that many technological 
developments will come from the commercial sector … [meaning] that state competitors 
and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks eroding the conventional 
overmatch to which our Nation has grown accustomed” (Office of the President of the 
United States, 2018, p. 3). The strategic approach in former Secretary Mattis’s National 
Defense Strategy includes three main lines of effort, of which the third is to transform the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) business practices (DoD; Office of the President of the 
United States, 2018). This third line of effort goes hand in hand with the increased attention 
on nontraditional contracting methods that diverge from the typical procurement 
procedures under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), supplements, and statutes and 
offer unique benefits and risks to the DoD acquisition community (Office of the President 
of the United States, 2018).  
Other Transaction (OT) agreements are a nontraditional contracting method that 
are exempt from the majority of federal procurement statutes and regulations, allowing for 
greater acquisition flexibility and private sector–related business practices. Section 10 of 
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United States Code (U.S.C.) 2371 grants the authority for the use of OTs in the DoD. OT 
agreements are designed for research and development, prototypes, and follow-on 
production of prototypes, where different contract financing terms and conditions can be 
utilized, intellectual property rights can be negotiated, and NDCs—who would typically 
not be incentivized to work with the DoD—can be leveraged. OT agreements originated in 
1958 with the enactment of the National Aeronautics and Space Act and creation of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (Schwartz & Peters, 2019). 
Congress has consistently expanded OT authorities and applicability since OTs have been 
authorized. OT authority was extended to the DoD through DARPA in 1989 and to the 
military services for advanced research projects in 1994 (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 37). 
Today, OTs are authorized by all military services and 11 other agencies for research, 
prototyping, and follow-on production of prototypes. The DoD obligates an estimated $300 
billion annually for research and development, mostly under procurement contracts 
governed through 10 U.S.C., the FAR, DFARS, and agency specific supplements 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019). In fiscal year (FY) 2017, the DoD obligated an estimated $2.1 
billion to prototype OT agreements, which may seem significant, but only accounts for 1% 
of its total obligations (Schwartz & Peters, 2019). This amount is predicted to increase 
significantly with the expanded authorities and threshold levels from Congress and 
increased attention on OTs in the acquisition community.  
As former Secretary of Defense Mattis emphasized, 
Current processes are not responsive to the need; the Department is over-
optimized for exceptional performance at the expense of providing timely 
decisions, policies, and capabilities to the warfighter. Our response will be 
to prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaption, and frequent modular 
upgrades. We must not accept cumbersome approval chains, wasteful 
applications of resources in uncompetitive space, or overly risk-adverse 
thinking that impedes change. (Office of the President of the United States, 
2018, p. 10) 
OTs and other nontraditional contracting methods offer an acquisition path for speed of 
award, as well as flexibility for adaptation in contract terms and prototyping. Although the 
increased use of OTs in the DoD is relatively recent—since the addition of OTs for 
prototypes in the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—there is already a 
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robust amount of informative literature to understand the intended use, advantages, and 
disadvantages of OT agreements, including the recent OT Guide, Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) reports, Government Accountability Office (GAO) decisions, and 
Congressional hearings. The most recent and informative document for the use of OT 
agreements in the DoD is the Other Transaction Authority Guide, last updated in November 
2018. The guide has undergone significant changes due to the increased use of OTs and 
increased congressional oversight. The guide includes myths and facts on OTs, case 
studies, definitions, and guidance for execution of OTs with planning, soliciting, 
evaluating, reporting, payment information, and legal information (OUSD(A&S), 2018).  
Due to the changing nature of warfare and the national emphasis on innovation, 
new literature is being published on nontraditional contracting methods, including OTs and 
NDCs. This research topic—examining the DoD’s use of OTs and the vendors receiving 
these agreements—is relevant and provides insight into an area that has not yet been 
researched. With the recent increased use and expanded thresholds of this special statutory 
authority, this research provides critical information for near-time policy decisions.  
A. PURPOSE STATEMENT  
This research furthers the DoD’s objectives from the National Security Strategy in 
support of gaining a technological advantage through an innovative industrial vendor base 
that provides access to cutting-edge weapons systems (Office of the President of the United 
States, 2018, p. 4). OTs provide a flexible acquisition tool that supports the intent of the 
National Defense Strategy to encourage prototyping and experimentation before specifying 
requirements in order to “allow the Department to more quickly respond to changes in the 
security environment and make it harder for competitors to offset our systems” (Office of 
the President of the United States, 2018, p. 11).  
This research has three main objectives. The first objective is to investigate 
alternative metrics to measure the innovative potential of NDCs through OT agreements. 
This is conducted through empirically testing a multi-item scale that measures the 
innovative potential of firms and assesses the predictive power for classifying firms under 
the current binary NDC classification. The second objective is to examine NDCs through 
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a spend analysis of archival Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation data. The 
DoD’s OT use has increased significantly with the expanded authorities. One of congress’s 
primary objectives in allowing acquisition flexibility through OTs is to attract NDCs as a 
proxy for innovative weapons systems. Third, this research helps to understand the 
characteristics of NDCs, which leads to formulating best practices to reach the NDCs for 
OT research, prototype, and production projects to broaden the DoD’s ability to access 
emerging technology from firms that would otherwise be unwilling to enter into contracts 
with the DoD, therefore increasing the pace of innovation. Examining whether the current 
definition of a NDC identifies the innovative characteristics the DoD is targeting is critical 
to improve the DoD’s access to the vendors and oversee the utilization of OT authority. 
Overall, a multi-item scale was proposed to measure the innovative potential of firms after 
scrutiny of the binary NDC classification, and this measure of innovative potential has not 
yet been empirically examined or tested. This research includes a spend analysis and an 
empirical test of the proposed measurement scale for the innovative potential of 
contractors.    
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Questions: Do the alternative metrics of distance to the nearest tech-hub, 
membership in a consortium, total DoD obligations, and compound annual growth measure 
the innovative potential of NDCs and have predictive power for classifying firms under the 
current binary NDC construct? What is the nature of the relationships between items in the 
proposed scale and the NDC classification? 
Secondary Question: From a spend analysis, what are trends in the DoD’s use of 
OTs? What are common characteristics of DoD OT vendors?  
The primary and secondary research questions provide a narrow view of OT use, 
however, contribute to the larger scale critical question of whether OTs provide an 
advantage to innovative technological advancements through NDCs. In addition, this 
research is an initial step in determining best methods and incentives to encourage NDCs 
to work with the DoD, since future decisions cannot be made without a clear understanding 
of the current industrial base for OT agreements. Also, this study evaluates four alternative 
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metrics, but opens for discussion other possible metrics for the innovative potential of 
firms.  
OTs are a hot topic in the acquisition community. The advantage for the DoD to 
adopt business practices similar to the private sector through OTs allows for flexibility to 
reach those entities whose primary business is not usually with the DoD. NDCs may be a 
critical tool for turning emerging technologies into military capabilities. This research will 
influence critical policy implications for the DoD and for the DoD’s ability to access 
innovation through research and development, prototyping and initial production from 
NDCs.  
C. RESEARCH BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research incorporates data from multiple sources. One of the sources is 
unclassified FPDS–NG data on OTs from FY2005–2018. The most authoritative contract 
data source is FPDS–NG for OT prototypes and production; however, research OT 
obligations along with grants and cooperative agreements are typically recorded in a 
different system called Defense Assistance Awards Data System (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, 
pp. 10–11). All data, including data from FPDS–NG, has imperfections, incomplete 
elements, and certain limitations by nature. FPDS–NG data, in particular, can have a delay 
up to 90 days in uploading and updating information regardless of fiscal year (Schwartz & 
Peters, 2019, p. 37). Data was also collected from consortia member lists and from the 
SAM API for firm-level registration information. Only consortiums that published 
membership lists were able to be used in the analysis. In addition, firms with clear 
registration matches to Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) in SAM API were used 
in the data fields. Any incomplete data fields were eliminated from analysis. 
This research analysis provides insights to answer the research questions on OT 
vendors and will help determine whether NDCs, with the current statutory definition in OT 
agreements, are a successful tool in innovative weapon systems acquisition. Understanding 
whether a contractor has innovative potential is a crucial distinction in acquisition, 
especially under OT agreements as Congress aims to improve the DoD’s access to speedy 
prototyping and research. The use of OTs and the validity of the classification of an NDC 
6 
has been criticized and under scrutiny in recent rapid defense acquisition literature.  This 
research advances the DoD acquisition field by assessing the measurement properties of 
an alternative proposed multi-item scale and its predictive power for classifying firms as 
NDCs. Since OT use has increased significantly in all DoD agencies and the advantages of 
contracting with NDCs have received increased attention, this research will provide 
information for critical policy decisions.     
D. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT   
This MBA professional report includes the following proposed chapters. First, 
Chapter I provides the introduction to this research including background information, the 
purpose, research questions, research benefits and limitations, and the overall organization 
of the report. Chapter II details the literature review with the OT agreement definition, 
history of OT use, DoD OT authority and legislative changes, benefits of OTs, risks of 
OTs, OT innovative potential, AF initiatives to reach NDCs, NDC significance, and 
measurement validity and reliability. Chapter III introduces the data, sample, variable 
operationalization, model specification, and methodology. Chapter IV highlights the 
results of the spend analysis and logistic regression model. Chapter V presents the 
discussion of the results, research limitations, and areas for future research and Chapter VI 
details overall conclusions for the research.   
E. SUMMARY  
OTs are a nontraditional contracting tool noteworthy for being defined by what they 
are not. OT agreements are not classified as typical FAR-based procurements and thereby 
are not applicable to the statutes under Title 10, the FAR, and agency-specific supplements. 
OT agreements do, however, provide a unique acquisition tool with opportunities for 
private industry business practices that incentivize NDCs to work with the DoD to leverage 
dual-use commercial technologies and state-of-the-art innovations in prototypes and 
research. OTs are a hot topic in the acquisition community since Congress has significantly 
expanded OT authorities and thresholds. The widened latitude of OT authority has the 
primary objective of providing access to emerging technologies in line with the National 
Defense Strategy and changing character of war. Since OTs have recently grown in use, 
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especially within the DoD, there is increased literature and research on the benefits and 
risks of this flexible acquisition tool. This research topic analyzes FPDS–NG data on DoD 
OT agreements that has not yet been empirically examined. A logistic regression model 
assesses alternative metrics to measuring innovative potential of nontraditional defense 
contractors in OT agreements. Understanding the nontraditional defense contractors 
receiving DoD OT agreements will provide insight into the utilization of OTs and inform 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Chapter II provides relevant literature covering the history of OT use, legislative 
changes, benefits and risks of OTs, and nontraditional defense contractor significance.    
A. OTHER TRANSACTION AGREEMENTS  
The majority of DoD acquisitions follow regulations and statutes under U.S. Code 
10, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the DFARS, and agency-specific 
regulations. There is an exception, however, where the DoD and other federal agencies are 
allowed to use a tool called the OT agreement. An OT agreement is notable for being 
defined by what it is not, providing flexibility and a “gray area” for acquisition 
professionals. The purpose of the OT agreement is to allow agencies acquisition flexibility 
to enter into business arrangements similar to the private sector and tailor financing terms, 
intellectual property agreements, incentives, and other terms and conditions specific and 
advantageous to the program. This ultimately allows the DoD to incentivize NDCs to work 
with the government, and allow for access to dual-use commercial technologies and 
innovative, fast-paced acquisition solutions.  
OTs are not categorized as FAR-based procurement contracts and thus do not have 
to comply with common acquisition statutes and regulations. The most impactful of these 
rules and regulations include the Truth in Negotiations Act, Procurement Integrity Act, 
Competition in Contracting Act, Cost Accounting Standards, Contract Disputes Act, and 
Bayh-Dole Act (Schwartz & Peters, 2019). Even though the Competition in Contracting 
Act is not applicable to OT agreements, competitive practices are to be used to the 
maximum extent practicable, but do not require sole source justifications and approvals 
(OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 38). Requirements related to national security such as the Trade 
Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. 1905), the Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. 1831–39), specific 
parts of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), and the Anti-Deficiency Act (31 
U.S.C. 1341) still apply to OT agreements (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 5). While 
exemptions from these regulations offer broader discretion to the DoD for acquisition 
flexibility to access innovative technologies and weapons systems, they also impose a 
10 
greater risk for checks on responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars and ethical 
acquisition practices. Aspects of the tailorable parts of OTs come from the flexibility that 
the agreements officer (AO) has in determining price reasonableness without restrictions 
with pricing data, fully negotiable intellectual property rights, contract financing 
agreements, and follow-on production opportunities (OUSD(A&S), 2018, pp. 17–18).  
1. Technology Investment Agreements  
The first type of OT agreement is for basic, applied, and advanced research, also 
referred to as a Technology Investment Agreement (TIA). TIAs are described under 32 
CFR 37.100 and authorized for OTs from 10 U.S.C 2371. In order to enter an OT 
agreement, the research must not duplicate work from another DoD program, half of the 
total cost should be shared with the contractor, and a grant or cooperative agreement must 
not be applicable to the situation (OUSD, 2017, p. 12). As seen in Table 1, the DoD 
Financial Management Regulation provides descriptions of the differences between basic, 
applied, and advanced research (OUSD, 2017, pp. 4–5).  
Table 1. DoD Financial Management Regulation. Adapted from 
OUSD(C) (2017, pp. 4–5).  
BA 1 Basic Research  Basic research is scientific study 
with the intent of increasing 
knowledge in the fields of physical, 
engineering, environmental, and life 
sciences contributing to national 
security needs. 
BA 2 Applied Research  Study to meet a specific need in 
effort to program and plan for 
potential solutions to complex 
technological problems. 
BA 3 Advanced Technology 
Development  
Development of subsystems to 
incorporate into prototyping ready 
for field testing.  
BA 4 Demonstration and Validation  Evaluation of technology or 





2. Prototype Other Transaction Agreements  
The second type of OT agreement derives authority from 10 U.S.C. 2371b and 
allows for prototyping, defined as addressing “a proof of concept, model, reverse 
engineering to address obsolescence, pilot, novel application of commercial technologies 
for defense purposes, agile development activity, creation, design, development, 
demonstration of technical or operational utility, or combinations of the foregoing” in the 
memorandum Definitions and Requirements for Other Transactions Under Title 10, United 
States Code, 2371b from November 2018 (OUSD(A&S), 2018, Appendix). Prototype OTs, 
if applicable, should include notification of the possibility of a follow-on competitive 
production OT after successful implementation of the prototype (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 
6). For a prototype to be considered successful before production, the project should have 
met specific goals and defined metrics and have provided an overall positive and favorable 
complete result (OUSD(A&S), 2018, Appendix memo). 
Prototype OTs that are compliant with statute 10 U.S.C. 2371b must enhance or 
improve mission effectiveness of the DoD and have specific participant requirements. The 
participants in a prototype OT agreement must satisfy at least one of the stipulations of 
involvement of at least one NDC or non-profit to a significant extent or all vendors small 
businesses (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 13). If the previous two requirements involving 
participation from NDCs do not apply, then an OT agreement may be awarded to a 
traditional defense contractor, but the contractor must cost-share at least one-third of the 
total expense with the government (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 13). Lastly, as with most 
procurement rules and regulations, there is an overarching exception for OT use if there is 
a justification from the senior procurement executive (SPE) (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 13).  
Compared to other acquisition vehicles, prototype OTs have minimal clarifying 
information, shared best practices, and regulations. The main sources of guidance are 
contained in policy memorandums and the Other Transaction Guide for Prototype Projects 
from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.  
A NDC is defined by the characteristic of not having been awarded or involved in 
a DoD contract in the past year. Furthermore, a NDC has not been involved in a DoD 
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acquisition requiring full cost accounting standards (CAS) coverage described in section 
1502 of Title 41 and 10 U.S.C. 2302(9) (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 31). This definition 
encompasses a large number of contractors, including almost all small businesses and a 
large number of large defense contractors that regularly work with the DoD. The wide 
latitude definition of a nontraditional defense contractor is “in part due to the exemptions 
to CAS coverage under 41 U.S.C. 1502 and FAR Part 30, which exempt commercial 
contracts, Firm Fixed Price contracts based on adequate price competition, and any contract 
or subcontract with a small business concern, amongst other exemptions” (OUSD(A&S), 
2018, p. 31). Specifically, the definition of full CAS coverage under 48 CFR 9903.201-2 
is pertinent only to CAS-covered contract awards over $50 million or combined CAS-
covered contracts valued above $50 million in the past accounting period (OUSD(A&S), 
2018, p. 31). This definition intends to capture NDCs by eliminating contractors already 
with CAS standards. The logic of defining a NDC by not having been subject to full CAS 
standards is due to the fact that full CAS coverage applies generally to contract awards 
valued over $50 million. Contracts at this dollar value would most likely be with traditional 
DoD contractors such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Under 48 CFR 9903.201-1, vendors 
are not subject to CAS if the contract type is sealed bid, subject to FAR Part 15, or below 
the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) threshold. In addition, 48 CFR 9903.201-1 provides 
exception for CAS to small businesses, contracts with predetermined prices, commercial 
items, and firm fixed price contracts with competition (CAS Applicability, 2008). These 
exceptions to full CAS allow a wide latitude of contractors to be classified as NDCs, 
without truly having unique innovative potential or first time contracting with the DoD.  
One common method of executing OT agreements is through the use of a 
consortium. A consortium is a group formed between industry members, academia, and 
non-profits with the goal of achieving more as a collective than with individual sources. 
Consortiums allow collaboration around themed technology areas, and members are 
allowed to submit white papers for solutions to a complex environment. Ideally 
consortiums are aimed at benefitting the DoD and other requirement owners by creating a 
diversified network of experts to encourage advancements and growth in defense sectors 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019).  
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3. Follow-on Production Other Transactions  
The third type of OT is for production, also detailed in 10 U.S.C. 2371b. In order 
to pursue a follow-on production OT, the original OT agreement requires previous mention 
of the possibility of a follow-on production and must have a complete and successful 
prototype. In order for a production follow-on OT to be non-competitively awarded, the 
initial prototype must have been competitively awarded (OUSD(A&S), 2018, 
Appendix C).  
A recent GAO case from 2018 highlights the necessity for both the early 
notification for a potential follow-on OT production agreement and a completed prototype. 
In this GAO case, one of the first DoD prototype projects to transition into a production 
OT agreement was a $65 million dollar agreement for cloud migration services. A 
competitive vendor, Oracle America, Inc., argued that the DoD did not fulfill 10 U.S.C. 
2371b’s statutory requirements to notify the potential for a follow-on production contract 
with the original prototype agreement to REAN Cloud LLC and also did not have a 
successful prototype at time of award. Overall, Oracle America, Inc.’s protest against the 
Army’s cloud migration services was investigated and upheld (GAO, 2018).  
B. HISTORY OF OT USE  
The OT authority was created in 1958 under the National Aeronautics and Space 
Act, which founded the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and 
provided the acquisition flexibility under Section 203(b)(5) to “enter into and perform such 
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the 
conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropriate” (Schwartz & Peters, 
2019, p. 21). The National Aeronautics and Space Act was enacted in order to catch up in 
the space race with the Soviet Union after the launch of Sputnik I (Schwartz & Peters, 
2019, p. 21).  
The DoD received authority, restricted to only DARPA, in 1989 through the NDAA 
of FY1990 and FY1991 to use OTs for advanced research projects (Schwartz & Peters, 
2019, p. 22). Congress limited appropriated funding for OTs and Cooperative Agreements 
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to $25 million and reviewed a mandatory report detailing the justification of the agreements 
and the associated benefits provided (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 22).  
The NDAA for FY1992 and FY1993 expanded OT authority for advanced research 
to all military departments in order to develop and leverage dual-use technologies 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 24). The NDAA for FY1994 expanded OT authority even 
further for military departments to use OT agreements for basic, advanced, and applied 
research (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 25). The NDAA for FY1994 also approved limited 
OT authority for three years for DARPA to enter into prototype agreements related to 
desired DoD weapons systems (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 25). The NDAA for FY1997 
expanded prototype OT authorities to military departments and officials designated by the 
secretary of defense (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 26). The NDAA for FY2001 added the 
nontraditional defense contractor stipulation for prototype OTs, and the NDAA for FY2002 
expanded authority to include the option for follow-on production from a prototype 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 28). The NDAA for FY2004 created a pilot program for 
prototype projects transitioning into follow-on production and widened the latitude for 
prototypes to develop or improve weapon systems for the DoD (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, 
p. 29). The NDAA for FY2016 expanded OT authority further and altered the definition of 
a nontraditional defense contractor to include more parties, including small businesses 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 32). The NDAA for FY2018 expanded to authorize nonprofits 
to enter into prototype OT agreements, and the NDAA for FY2019 authorized OTs for 
enhanced personal protective equipment and research areas under the Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Defense Program (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 33).  
As evident through the constant expanding of authorities regarding OTs, Congress 
has given wider latitude and more direction toward encouraging and guiding the increased 
use of OTs for developing state-of-the-art technologies and weapons systems for the DoD 
(see Table 2).  
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Table 2. OT Authority—Legislative History. Adapted from Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (2017, pp. 34–35). 
Year Congressional Authorization  
1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act introduces OT authority  
1989 DARPA granted OT authority for advanced research projects in the 
FY1990 NDAA  
1993 DARPA temporarily (three years) allowed to use OTs prototypes in 
FY1994 NDAA  
1996 Military departments allowed to use OTs in FY1997   
2000 NDC definition and requirement for one-third of total cost-sharing are 
added in the FY2001 NDAA 
2001 Follow-on Production to prototype OT is introduced in FY2002 NDAA. 
This is limited to a defined number and price for prototypes.  
2003 FY2004 NDAA develops the definition of a weapons system 
2005 FY2006 NDAA defines monetary threshold levels for approval and adds 
the applicability of the Procurement Integrity Act 
2014 Small businesses are excused from cost sharing requirement in FY2015 
NDAA  
2015 FY2016 NDAA permanently grants OT authority to 10 U.S.C. 2371b and 
expands the definition of NDCs and follow-on production agreements  
2017 FY2018 NDAA clarifies training requirements regarding OTs, increases 
approval threshold levels, and allows for follow-on production for sub-
awards in a consortium. Also, prototype agreements are authorized for 
SBIRs and non-profit entities.  
2018 FY2019 NDAA changes the highest approval level from the USD(AT&L) 
to the USD(A&S) or USD(R&E), adds explanations on follow-on 
production from agreements with consortiums, and expands on the 
requirements for OT data reporting and collecting.  
 
In the most recent CRS report, FPDS–NG data from FY2017 showed that a total of 
$2.1 billion was obligated for prototype OT agreements, which seems significant, but 
actually accounts for less than 1% of the DoD’s total contract obligations for that year 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 11). With the expanded OT authority, the use of OTs is 
predicted to increase even more and has shown a significant increase from 12 to 94 
agreements from FY2013 to FY2017 (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 11). See Table 3 and 
Table 4 for a further breakdown.  
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Table 3. Annual New DoD Prototype Agreements, FY2013–
FY2017, Depicted by Funding Agency. Source: Schwartz and Peters (2019, 
p. 12). 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
DARPA 
 




- - 2 9 27 
Dept. of the 
Air Force  
 
- - - 5 16 
Dept. of the 
Army 
 
1 3 - 7 14 
Dept. of the 
Navy  
 
3 5 2 - 2 
NSA/CSS 
 















- - - - 2 
Not Indicated  6 7 14 14 31 




Table 4. Annual New DoD Prototype Agreements, FY2013–
FY2017, Depicted by Contracting Agency. Source: Schwartz and Peters 
(2019, p. 12). 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
DARPA 
 
6 6 13 12 23 
Dept. of the 
Air Force 
 
- - - 5 5 
Dept. of the 
Army  
 
4 7 5 18 66 
Dept. of the 
Navy  
 




1 2 1 - - 
Total  12 16 19 35 94 
 
In 2017, Ellen Lord, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, demonstrated her support of increased OT use by stating, 
I will drive expanded use of Other Transaction Authorities (OTA) by 
focusing on and encouraging those DoD requiring organizations that could 
benefit from access to nontraditional sources of innovative technology that 
might be adapted, as in the case of prototypes, to enhance the combat 
capability of our forces. I believe there are opportunities to judiciously 
employ these authorities more broadly across the Department. (Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 2017, p. 18) 
This further supports the prediction that OTs will continue to be increasingly used within 
the DoD.  
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C. DOD OT AUTHORITY AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES  
There are not designated approval thresholds for TIAs and research OTs; however, 
prototype OTs have the statutory approval levels from the most recent policy shown in 
Table 5 (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 15). There are also agency-specific rules and regulations 
for prototype OTs.  
Table 5. Authority for Use of OTs for Prototypes, Source: Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(2018, p. 44). 
  Transaction Value  
Organization Up to $100 Million $100M to $500 
Million 






























Director Director USD(R&E) or 
USD(A&S) 
 
As shown in Table 6, other non-DoD agencies also have OT authority. Note that 
this is not an all-inclusive list since OT authority can also be distributed on a specific 
program basis (Schwartz & Peters, 2019). Eleven federal agencies and other offices have 
OT authority (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 36). 
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Table 6. Selected Non-DoD Federal Agencies with OT or Related 









OT Authority  
Advanced 
Research Project 
Agency – Energy  
Yes No Yes - 42 U.S.C. 16538 
Dept. of Energy  Yes No No 2020 42 U.S.C 7256 
Dept. of Health 
and Human 
Services  




Yes Yes No 2018 6 U.S.C. 391 and 538 
Dept. of 
Transportation  
Yes No Yes - 49 U.S.C. 5312 
Domestic 
Nuclear 
Detection Office  
Yes Yes Yes - 6 U.S.C. 596 
Federal Aviation 
Administration  









Yes No Yes - 49 U.S.C. 114(m) 
 
1. Agreements Officer  
The government official entrusted with the authority to enter into and administer 
OTs is the agreements officer (AO). The responsibilities of the AO include negotiating, 
initiating, and administering OTs, and the AO is not required to be a contracting officer 
(OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 29). 
The GAO conducted a report titled Use of “Other Transaction” Agreements 
Limited and Mostly for Research and Development Activities to detail the agencies allowed 
to enter into OTs and to what extent they have executed this authority (GAO, 2016). Out 
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of the agencies authorized to use OTs, the main advantage described is the flexibility to 
negotiate individualized agreements for intellectual property and cost accounting 
provisions. The DoD is the only agency with its own individualized guidance for prototype 
projects in the Other Transactions (OT) Guide for Prototype Projects (OUSD(A&S), 
2018). Table 7 illustrates the number of active OT agreements for each agency, 
highlighting the increased use in the DoD and the relatively low number of agreements 
overall.   
Table 7. Active OT Agreements, FY2010–FY2014. Source: GAO 
(2016, p. 27).   
Agency  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Advanced Research 
Projects Agency – 
Energy  
3 3 3 3 0 
Dept. of Defense  69 76 88 77 79 
Dept. of Energy  2 3 3 3 3 
Dept. of Health and 
Human Services  
0 0 0 1 1 
Dept. of Homeland 
Security  
19 14 8 4 3 
Dept. of Transportation  75 54 30 26 21 
Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office  
0 0 0 0 0 
Federal Aviation 
Administration  




2,217 2,611 2,891 3,080 3,223 
National Institutes of 
Health  
6 6 6 5 5 
Transportation Security 
Administration  
408 435 564 579 637 
 
The Other Transaction Guide for Prototype Projects is the most used and 
referenced source of guidance and lessons learned for prototype OTs issued by the under 
secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment (OUSD(A&S), 2018). The guide 
includes best practices and extensive information, but it is not a mandatory policy. The 
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guide allows for flexibility and sound business judgment with a consolidated source of 
information and resources. According to the program office’s business judgment, prototype 
OTs are optional to fall under DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System if relevant and providing advantage (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 5).  
2. Bayh-Dole Act  
Previously called the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, the Bayh-Dole 
Act directs intellectual property rights for inventions created with federal government 
participation under Title 35, Chapter 18 (Sec. 200 et seq.) (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 3). 
An overall knowledge of this act is relevant in OT execution because OT agreements are 
not required to abide by the regulations, however, the justification of the act and the 
corresponding impact on commercial firms will help negotiate favorable intellectual 
property terms for both parties.  
3. Better Buying Power 3.0 
Better Buying Power 3.0, titled Achieving Dominant Capabilities through 
Technical Excellence and Innovation, places a “stronger emphasis on innovation, technical 
excellence, and the quality of our products” (Kendall, 2015, p. 1). Better Buying Power 3.0 
builds off the BBP 1.0 and 2.0 directives and advances in technological superiority by 
reducing unnecessary bureaucratic obstructions and boosting innovation in the 
government. Specific to OTs, BBP 3.0 directs increased access to modernization and state-
of-the-art technology within the security environment by encouraging increased use of OT 
agreements to incite NDCs, entrepreneurs, and inventors (Kendall, 2016, p. 16).  
4. Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) 
Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter initiated an outreach organization 
called Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) to establish a DoD presence in 
technology hot spots such as Silicon Valley (GAO, 2017a, pp. 27–29). Initially, in 2015, 
DIUx did not have the authority to enter into contracts or obligate funds. In 2016, DIUx 
was granted OT authority, initiating its leadership in prototyping agreements as well as its 
research and development precedents for the DoD (GAO, 2017a, pp. 27–29). DIUx’s main 
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focus areas for innovation are artificial intelligence, human systems, information 
technology, and space systems (GAO, 2017a, pp. 27–29). From initial creation to March 
2017, DIUx issued 25 OT agreements totaling $48.4 million in an average of 59 days 
(GAO, 2017a, pp. 27–29). For these OT agreements, DIUx preceded the Commercial 
Solutions Opening process, similar to Broad Agency Announcements, where a requirement 
topic is publicly posted and vendors can submit solutions in a proposal for commercial 
technology prototypes and receive OT agreements in a typical timeline of 60 days, 
significantly faster than the traditional FAR-based contracting process (GAO, 2017a, pp. 
7–29).  
D. BENEFITS OF OTHER TRANSACTION AGREEMENTS  
One of the main benefits of using an OT agreement instead of another acquisition 
model is the shortened contract award time. Although the flexibility and wide latitude of 
OT agreements intuitively allows for fast execution, there is not yet research literature or 
data to prove such claims (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 16). After OT authority was 
expanded by Congress in 1994, the DoD tasked RAND with researching the OT 
agreements initiated between 1994 and 1998 in order to assess the benefits, risks, and 
overall effects of the increased use. The report concluded with three main generalizations: 
(1) new industrial resources were added into the DoD innovation vendor base due to the 
increased acquisition flexibility, (2) benefits of OTs are more than just attracting new 
NDCs, but also better value with cost-sharing, beneficial agreement modifications, and 
innovative business arrangements, and (3) the benefits outweigh the risks to the DoD with 
being able to tailor intellectual property and financial plans in OT use with less oversight 
(Smith, Drezner, & Lachow, 2002, p. ix). 
1. Prototyping Advantage  
The GAO investigated how prototyping has fueled the DoD in its innovative 
development of weapons systems (GAO, 2017b, pp. 1–18). Overall, annually the DoD 
spends $70 billion in weapon system research, which includes, but does not consist entirely 
of prototyping (GAO, 2017b, pp. 1–18). Researching 22 major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs), 17 of which used prototyping, provides insight into how prototyping 
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aids designs and mature technologies, along with further defining requirements and 
potential costs, and determining the realism of the desired programs (GAO, 2017b, pp. 1–
18). There are barriers for prototyping, especially within the DoD environment due to 
limited funding discretion from congressional oversight, a risk-adverse bureaucratic 
structure in the DoD acquisition community, changing priorities, and long budget 
timelines. The DoD recognizes three different types of prototypes, all with differing 
purposes and time frames to implement into full weapon system programs. The three types 
of prototypes in order of increasing capability development are conceptual, development, 
and operational. Of the programs reviewed in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, program 
officials found that 16 or 17 prototyping programs had a positive return on investment, 
especially with those riskier projects, and helped develop solutions, refine requirements, 
and more accurately estimate costs factors. Twelve of the 17 prototyping programs used 
competitive prototyping where multiple contractors provided prototypes with different 
designs and proposed solutions to best meet the DoD’s needs (GAO, 2017b, pp. 34–36). 
Overall, the GAO recommended implementation of department-wide guidance for more 
strategic prototyping efforts to improve system performance and encourage fast adoption. 
2. Engaging with Nontraditional Defense Contractors 
The GAO was tasked with conducting a study on 12 innovative companies in the 
private industry and understanding why those companies did not typically contract with 
the DoD. This study is especially relevant because research and development investments 
have consistently been more prevalent in the private industry than in the DoD’s R&D 
spending. Therefore, it is crucial that the DoD can partner with those companies leaning 
forward in technology advancement and prototyping (GAO, 2017a). An example of how 
the DoD acquisition process can be especially discouraging for nontraditional defense 
contractors was highlighted in the report when one innovative nontraditional defense 
contractor stated that it took “25 full time employees, 12 months and millions of dollars to 
prepare a proposal for a DoD contract” compared to “3 part time employees, 2 months, and 
only thousands of dollars to prepare a commercial contract for a similar contract” (GAO, 
2017a, p. 1).  
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The six main challenges that discourage nontraditional defense contractors from 
engaging in federal contracting are the DoD’s widely integrated processes, intellectual 
property issues, fiscal concerns, DoD unique contracting requirements, lengthy acquisition 
times, and low experience–level workers (GAO, 2017a). Optimistically, a number of these 
challenges described by nontraditional innovative companies can be eliminated through 
OT agreements and the ability to tailor terms and conditions for individual prototypes and 
research projects. Table 8 illustrates the GAO’s findings of the top ranked innovative firms 
and their overall revenue from DoD contracts. From the study, the companies considered 
most innovative had a minimal percentage of sales from DoD awards, stressing untapped 
innovation for the DoD to partner with companies outside the traditional defense sector.   
Table 8. Top Innovative U.S. Companies’ Revenue from DoD 
Contracts (2016). Source: GAO (2017a, p. 8). 
Company  Sales ($ billions) Percentage of sales 
derived from DoD 
contracts  
Apple  216 < 1 
Amazon 136 < 1 
General Electric  111 < 2 
3M 30 < 1 
Google 90 0 
Microsoft  85 < 1 
IBM 80 < 1 
Hewlett Packard  48 < 2 
Facebook  28 0 
Tesla  7 < 1 
 
3. Cost-Sharing 
The Report to Congress: An Assessment of Cost-Sharing in Other Transaction 
Agreements for Prototype Projects was conducted in 2017 to investigate the benefits and 
risks of cost-sharing within prototype OT agreements and to provide policy 
recommendations from the findings (OUSD(AT&L), 2017). Under the authority for 
prototype OTs, 10 U.S.C 2371b allows the DoD to negotiate unique terms and conditions 
within the agreement but provides stricter guidance on who should receive the OT 
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prototype agreements. The purpose of this specific guidance is to incentivize nontraditional 
defense contractors through OTs to share state-of-the-art technologies. In research OTs, 
called TIAs, cost sharing is always required for at least half of the total cost to ensure the 
contractor also has a vested interest in the research outcomes. In the prototype OTs, 
however, the flexibility in cost-sharing is intended to draw new vendors into the DoD 
innovation base by allowing new startups or unincentivized companies to not commit their 
own funding or financing. Interestingly, this study also found that between FY2013 and 
FY2016, there was only 4% of an average cost-share rate, supporting that the OT statute 
as written is promoting the intended vendor pool of nontraditional defense contractors and 
small businesses (OUSD(AT&L), 2017).  
The contractor is required to cost share for one-third of the agreement if a NDC is 
not involved to a significant extent, all vendors are small businesses or NDCs, or there is 
an extenuating circumstance justified by the SPE. The definition of a nontraditional defense 
contractor was changed from whether the vendor had used certified cost or pricing data at 
all to whether a vendor received a full CAS contract or contract within the past year. This 
change in definition created a wider latitude of companies that could now be classified as 
a nontraditional defense contractor, therefore eliminating any required cost-sharing with 
the federal government. One of the main recommendations of this study was to add 
nonprofits into the exception for cost-sharing, along with small businesses and 
nontraditional defense contractors, because nonprofits are unique and do not fit into a 
specific category of traditional defense contractors or small businesses. Because of this, 
they could offer innovative and educational solutions to DoD requirements 
(OUSD(AT&L), 2017).  
Although this congressional hearing references the Department of Homeland 
Security’s OT Use, not the DoD’s, it emphasizes that OTs provide a unique tool with the 
flexibility to tailor agreements to bring in nontraditional defense contractors in order to 
maximize talent and innovation in private sector available technologies. However, there 
are very unique circumstances where OTs are the appropriate instrument for contractual 
agreements and present a higher risk for lack of accountability and oversight (U.S. 
Congress, 2008).  
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E. RISKS OF OTHER TRANSACTION AGREEMENTS  
With the increased flexibility of OTs comes additional risks to the DoD. This 
section covers OT agreement risks such as oversight issues and improper use and 
corresponding case study examples.  
The Army entered into an OT agreement for a system of systems program with a 
Lead Systems Integrator for an estimated $108 billion in order to replace an inventory for 
ground vehicles, aircraft, sensors, and munitions connected on an intertwined network 
(GAO, 2005). The OT agreement was awarded to Boeing, a traditional defense contractor, 
however, due to the “significant involvement” of nontraditional robotics companies in the 
program, Boeing did not have to cost-share in the agreement or provide any exception 
(Gansler, Greenwalt, & Lucyshyn, 2013, p. 69). This agreement caught attention two years 
after initiation due to $4.6 billion already obligated, lack of requirements development, and 
only one system at mature development. The GAO completed the study in order to 
investigate and provide recommendations for the cost risks and progress delays (GAO, 
2005). The GAO report (2005) saw problems with using FCS program through an OT and 
highlighted concerns with government financial oversight and protection of intellectual 
property rights.  
While there has not been further research on the risks of OTs and who is receiving 
the awards, there is the risk of using OTs to circumvent procurement statutes and 
regulations. One concern highlighted in a DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) report was that 
from FY1994 to FY2001, traditional defense contractors received 95% of the 209 prototype 
agreements valued at $5.7 billion (Office of the Inspector General, 2002, p. 11). In addition, 
a reporter from Federal News Network claimed more recently that from FY2015 to 
FY2017, NDCs received more of the new OT agreements (66%), but the agreements that 
went to traditional defense contractors were higher dollar value ($20.8 billion compared to 
$7.4 billion for NDCs; (Maucione, 2018). This potential risk of OT agreements with 
traditional defense contractors could show the that flexibility authorized to bring new 
vendors into the DoD innovation base is not working as intended.  
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Competition to the maximum extent practicable is encouraged but not mandatory 
in OTs, which raises concerns over sole source programs; however, FPDS–NG data 
supports the observation that the DoD competed 89% of new OT prototypes under 10 
U.S.C. 2371b (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 16).  
Following the congressional discussion regarding the Department of Homeland 
Security’s OT agreements and the expansion of OT authority, the Congressional Research 
Service published a general report in 2011 overviewing OT authority. Since OTs do not 
fall under FAR regulations and typical procurement statutes, all aspects of reporting and 
tracking the agreements proves to be difficult, ranging from contractor performance, 
functions, and outcomes of OTs. This inevitably leads to challenges in objective evaluation 
and data collection for other transactions throughout all authorized agencies and the DoD 
(Halchin, 2011).  
A recent GAO decision dismissed a protest on improper evaluation of a proposal 
from small business MD Helicopters, Inc., on the decision of the Army Futures Command 
to not use a prototype OT for an acquisition vehicle for a future attack reconnaissance 
aircraft. Since OTs are not considered procurement contracts, the GAO is not responsible 
for reviewing protests (GAO, 2019). If an agency has the authority to enter into an 
agreement under its OT authority, that agreement is not eligible for the Bid Protest 
Regulations under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA). This means the 
GAO does not have the discretion to expand its jurisdiction beyond the congressionally-
provided CICA limits of “reviewing protests concerning alleged violations of procurement 
statutes or regulations by federal agencies in the award or proposed award of contracts for 
the procurement of goods and services, and solicitations leading to such award” (31 U.S.C. 
3551(1)).  
The GAO does have the authority, however, to review protests on the basis that an 
agency is “improperly using a non-procurement instrument to procure goods or services,” 
as established through a protest from ACI Technologies in 2019 (GAO, 2019, p.3). In this 
protest, ACI Technologies, a small business, protested the Navy’s solicitation for a 
consortium for an OT agreement for Strategic & Spectrum Missions Advanced Resilient 
Trusted Systems on the basis that the solicitation is for a prototype that duplicates existing 
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research (GAO, 2019). The GAO reviewed this case because ACI claimed the Navy was 
“improperly using a non-procurement instrument to procure goods or services” (GAO, 
2019). The S2MARTS OT solicitation was targeted towards innovative prototypes for 
electromagnetic spectrum, microelectronics, and strategic mission’s hardware 
environments, and ACI already had an indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity contract for 
advanced manufacturing technologies in the advanced electronics industrial base (GAO, 
2019). Because ACI felt their IDIQ requirements overlapped with the OT solicitation 
requirements, they protested that the solicitation is not under prototype authority under 10 
U.S.C. 2371b and the research under the OT solicitation is duplicative of ACI’s already 
awarded contract. GAO dismissed the protest due to the military departments’ authority 
under 10 U.S.C. 2371 to enter into other transactions and insufficient evidence to prove 
that the OT solicitation was not for already prototyped projects or for duplicative research 
(GAO, 2019).  
F. OTHER TRANSACTIONS AND INNOVATIVE POTENTIAL   
Before Congress expanded OT prototype authority, the DoD’s OT obligations 
increased by 46% between FY2012 and FY2015 (Govini, n.d., p. 4). After the NDAA 
FY2016 expansion, the DoD OTA obligations increased by 122% (Govini, n.d., p. 4). 
Overall, the Govini report makes the point that the current definition of an NDC is too 
broad and does not necessarily correlate to an innovative vendor that is not incentivized to 
work with the DoD. Instead of accounting for innovation potential for emerging 
technologies, the Govini report recommends three metrics to assess whether the increased 
use and authority of OTs is achieving the goal of capitalizing on the best technology in the 
private sector at a faster pace than in traditional contracting (Govini, n.d.).  
The first suggested innovation metric is the innovation force, which compares a 
company’s total obligations to its compound annual growth rate (CAGR) during the same 
time frame. Ultimately this would show a vendor exhibiting innovation in their business 
practice. Using this metric, the report determined that 51.7% of DoD OT agreements were 
with vendors that exhibited at least one of the two components of a “High Innovation Force 
(high acceleration or high mass), supporting that “OTAs may help the DoD foster a market 
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of vendors with unique technologies or services that could break into the High Innovation 
Force category and then be contracted with traditionally using FAR contract strategies” 
(Govini, n.d., p. 8). Innovative force was calculated for RDT&E vendors as well and 
showed that OTs had a higher proportion of vendors with high acceleration or high mass 
(51.7% OTA, 43.9% RDT&E).  
The second innovative metric was geography and the location of the contract place 
of performance in order to visualize if there are certain Silicon Valley–type hubs where the 
OT vendors are concentrated. Essentially, the closer the company is located to a “tech-
hub,” the higher potential for innovation. The Govini report found that the majority of OTA 
vendors were concentrated in five cities; however, these cities were not considered high-
tech hubs. This was due to the large dollar OT agreements being awarded to consortiums 
located in non-tech-hub cities, such as Advanced Technology International in 
Summerville, SC. The consortium masks the location of the companies performing the OTs 
because the member list can consist of hundreds of innovative companies that may be in 
Silicon Valley or other technology- rich cities, but the consortium has the agreement and 
provides the overarching management role (Govini, n.d., p. 9). 
The third innovative metric was the use of consortiums. Consortiums allow for 
business entities, nonprofit, and academics to collaborate on specific technology areas and 
overall is seen as an advantage for innovative potential. The analysis found that 
consortiums received 46% of all OTA obligations from FY2012 to FY2018, 34 percentage 
points more than the share within the RDT&E awards (Govini, n.d., p. 9).  
Although the GAO has limited oversight and protest review authority since OTs 
are not considered procurement contracts, the GAO is still responsible for auditing OT 
prototype agreements higher than $5 million as directed by the NDAA for FY2000 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2019). 
The Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects Other Transaction Guide for 
Prototypes highlighted three case studies of successful implementation of OT agreements 
and corresponding outcomes and lessons learned (OUSD(A&S), 2018). In 2017, DARPA 
entered into a prototype OT agreement for Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites 
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in order to partner with the private sector to service government and commercial satellites 
to repair or upgrade the satellites instead of having to discard them (OUSD(A&S), 2018, 
p. 6). From using a prototype OT, DARPA was able to implement unique cost-sharing 
arrangements for payloads and special incentive-based payments in order to leverage 
creation of a new marketplace for space robotics. DIU executed a prototype OT for the Air 
Operations Center Pathfinder Program for creation of a new web-based software 
application to schedule air refueling, designed to replace the current system of scheduling 
by handwritten methods. DIU and AOC were able to successfully partner and integrate an 
innovative solution for scheduling efficiencies to be used throughout the DoD by having 
separate agencies hire individual software developers. This prototype OT was 
competitively awarded by DIU and Army Contracting Command–New Jersey, but the Air 
Force entered immediately into a sole source production OT (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 8). In 
1994, DARPA demonstrated immense success of aircraft development and production 
success through the use of a prototype OT for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) Global 
Hawk requiring an altitude of 60,000 feet, the ability to stay in flight for a full 24 hours, 
and a maximum price of $10 million per aircraft. Unusual to traditional contracts, DARPA 
was able to constrain the price tag of the UAVs, while allowing for industry ingenuity and 
trade-offs of different performance parameters and capabilities. The UAV, Global Hawk, 
also allowed for the contractors to collaborate and share ideas. After narrowing it down 
from eight different UAV prototypes, the selected prototype was sent into production with 
a budget of $372 million over a period of seven years. Overall, the program was a 
tremendous success, especially considering a normal timeline for the development of an 
aerial vehicle spans two decades (OUSD(A&S), 2018, p. 12).  
Measuring innovative potential in future business partners is relevant in assessing 
whether the risk of investing in certain businesses is worth the potential reward. While 
there are no standardized innovation metrics, commonly used internal metrics correspond 
to results such as annual research and development budgets, sales of new products, the 
number of patents, new product generation versus altering existing products, and active 
innovation projects in a portfolio within a company. In order to create a more accurate 
innovation measurement, the metrics should be designed based on what the specific 
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company needs to improve on by first assessing the current innovation practices to make 
sure they correspond to company goals, tailoring and implementing innovation practices 
(Richtner, Brattstrom, Frishammer, Bjork, & Magnusson, 2017). 
G. AIR FORCE INITIATIVES TO REACH NONTRADITIONAL DEFENSE 
CONTRACTORS  
AFWERX was established by a Partnership Intermediary Agreement under 15 
U.S.C. 3715 in 2017 by Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson and reports directly to 
the vice chief of staff of the Air Force. The intent behind creating this organization is to 
encourage innovation hubs to embrace opportunities for the Air Force from Airmen, 
academia, and nontraditional contractors (AFWERX, n.d.). AFWERX currently has three 
locations in Washington, DC; Austin, TX; and Las Vegas, NV. For Airmen, AFWERX has 
created a Spark Tank where Airmen can propose innovative solutions to any Air Force 
problem in order to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation from those who see the 
problems first (AFWERX, n.d.). Internally, AFWERX will support bases and entrepreneur 
Airmen with Squadron Innovation Funds (AFWERX, n.d.). Attracting nontraditional 
defense contractors, AFWERX hosts Multi-Domain Operation Challenges where outside 
sources can demonstrate their artificial intelligence, real-time data analysis, data security 
techniques, and communication through a decentralized network (outside sources include 
U.S. or allied nations, individuals, teams, academics, research labs, small businesses, start-
ups, and traditional or nontraditional defense contractors for an integrated solution) 
(AFWERX, n.d.). AFWERX also hosts acquisition events for local vendors in order to 
introduce Small Business Innovative Research areas of interest. The goal of these events 
is to find collaborative and innovative solutions and discover vendor capabilities for future 
contract opportunities. Lastly, AFWERX engages nontraditional vendors through 
commercial solutions openings (CSO), where innovative commercial items, technologies, 
or services can be put on a DoD contract after competitively selecting proposals from a 
general solicitation as authorized under the 2017 NDAA (AFWERX, n.d.).  
The Air Force has also started hosting themed Pitch Days showcasing Small 
Business Innovative Research areas of interest where companies can submit short white 
papers and function more like a venture capital firm (Slaughter, 2019). The Air Force also 
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awards small contracts on site at these events. The Pitch days have been themed on topics 
such as space, simulators, artificial intelligence, machine learning, data analytics, rapid 
sustainment, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), airborne communications, 
and hypersonic (Slaughter, 2019).  
H. NONTRADITIONAL CONTRACTOR SIGNIFICANCE  
In order to fully understand the research question addressed in this study, the 
significance of why the DoD prioritizes innovation and the use of NDCs is discussed. The 
United States achieved global technological advantage during the Cold War in nuclear 
capabilities and in the 1970s with critical advances in stealth, precision, and 
communications (Govini, n.d., p. 2). While the United States still has the military 
advantage today, the nature of warfare has changed to trends in artificial intelligence, 
robotics, cyber, space, and electronic warfare. Also, fast-paced emerging technologies are 
no longer coming from DoD research, but instead from the private sector. Due to this 
change, the DoD needs to leverage the private sector’s cutting-edge technologies by 
adapting best practices in the acquisition process and integrating them into military 
capabilities (Govini, n.d., p. 2).  
In today’s global security environment, China and Russia are the great power 
competitors with the United States. China, in particular, has a history of capitalizing 
heavily on integrating foreign and private sector technologies into its military capabilities.  
According to a 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency report, China has 
shifted funds and efforts to acquiring technology by any means 
available…Domestic laws forced foreign partners of Chinese-based foreign 
joint ventures to release their technology in exchange for entry into China’s 
lucrative market, and China has used other means to secure the needed 
technology and expertise. The result of this multifaceted approach to 
technology acquisition is a PLA on the verge of fielding some of the most 
modern weapon systems in the world. (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, 
p. 5) 
With the rising power status of China and its advances in technology and weapon systems, 
the United States faces a critical need to develop and modernize for long-term military 
advantage.  
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The 2013 Gansler report highlights the critical importance of incorporating non-
traditional commercial contractors into DoD acquisitions. In the 1960s the United States 
was the predominant spender for research, responsible for an estimated 67% of all R&D 
spending, fueling innovation in the economy. Today, the innovative forces have shifted to 
the private sector providing over 60% of research funding (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 6). In 
order to access commercial technologies, the government enacted a number of acquisition 
reforms including the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 in order to function 
more in line with the private sector and reduce the typical DoD culture of risk and lengthy 
bureaucratic acquisition process. If the DoD is not able to access commercial technologies 
directly, there is likelihood that commercial firms will sell technologies to the DoD through 
mediators that will result in a higher cost. The Gansler et al. (2013) report stresses the point 
that the DoD  
risks falling behind technologically in the future, as commercial companies 
refuse to modify their commercial-off-the-shelf products to avoid 
complying with government unique oversight requirements, share their 
intellectual property with the government for fear of having it released, and 
invest in cutting edge R&D in the United States but rather move this 
investment overseas to avoid the reach of U.S. export controls and security 
requirements. (p. 7)  
Overall, to access the advantages of the private sector capabilities, the DoD is 
recommended to optimize NDCs, expand the use of OTs, and improve market research to 
better understand the commercial capabilities available (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 8). If the 
DoD is not able to effectively incorporate private sector commercial technologies into 
military requirements, there will be duplicative research and wasted time and funding in 
research and developments where the technology is already available (Gansler et. al., 2013, 
p. 2). 
The Packard Commission of 1986 was significant in the fact that it “ultimately 
turned to the problems embedded in the acquisition process and the elimination of barriers 
which had up to this point discouraged the DoD’s acquisition of cutting-edge technologies” 
(Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 8). The commission emphasized commercial practices to be used 
in the government and reduced dependence on specifications unique to the military. When 
commercial technologies are not accessed in an efficient manner, commercial companies 
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are faced with the trade-off of whether they can financially support doing business with the 
government. Typically, as seen with Boeing and other traditional defense contractors, 
companies have to create separate business lines in order to specialize in the military 
unique requirements (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 12).  
The DoD gains advantage not only from leveraging the commercial dual-use 
technologies, but also in manufacturing techniques and best practices that can result in 
reduced costs and efficiencies. “Commercial business practices in logistics, transportation, 
inventory tracking, and other aspects of supply chain management can be emulated in the 
DoD, if it is open to such money- and time-saving ideas” (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 23). 
In order to understate the current definition of a NDC, it is important to understand 
the characteristics of what a NDC is not. There are a number of ways to classify what the 
DoD is purchasing through the industrial base by looking at the specific kinds of goods and 
services, the contracting types, and technology areas (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 24). When a 
good or service is purchased through a traditional defense contractor, familiar names such 
as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrup Grumman come to mind. Traditional defense 
contractors tend to be defined by their large weapon system sales with the DoD resulting a 
large amount of revenue from the DoD versus the private sector revenue (Gansler et. al., 
2013, p. 24). This is not always a reliable measurement, however, because large companies 
can separate into defense-focused entities, for example, Boeing Defense, Space, and 
Security from Boeing Commercial Airplanes (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 24). Another flaw in 
this measure is due to large companies such as United Technologies and Honeywell, which 
both have large aggregate defense sales (21% and 13.25% respectively), but the sales are 
minimal compared to the total sales of the company (Gansler et. al., 2013, p.25). Typically, 
commercial firms that have been successful with DoD contracts separate their commercial 
side from the defense side rather than undertaking civil–military integration. Rockwell 
Collins, however, integrated its civil and military requirements and overall, reduced costs 
for the DoD and increased efficiencies since separate facilities, management, and other 
resources are uneconomical (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 27). The types of contracts and 
regulations are another way to distinguish between traditional and nontraditional defense 
contractors. As defined in the statute, a NDC is distinguished from not having a full CAS-
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covered contract in the preceding year. Logically, this would identify a potential NDC 
because large traditional defense contractors would already have the CAS practices and 
structure in place for government-specific regulations and requirements (Gansler et. al., 
2013, p. 28). OTs provide a flexible and streamlined tool that would enable NDCs to bypass 
these regulations if determined unnecessary. Of note, the NDC definition in statute also 
specifies “entity” rather than contractor, which is important in establishing the defense 
industrial base because it is inclusive of firms, nonprofits, and academic institutions 
(Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 31). Finding the ideal definition and classification for an 
innovative NDC is difficult considering how organizations structure in varying ways in 
culture, practices, and profit centers, depending on their overall goals and expertise 
(Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 32).  
There are various barriers that impede commercial contractors from sharing their 
technologies, solutions, and products in government contracts, as described by Gansler et 
al. (2013). The first barrier is the environmental barrier of working with the government 
and the inherent time-consuming, regulatory requirements, and reputation risk. In DoD 
contracts, as Gansler et al. describe, there is an uncommonly high risk if there are 
compliance issues or criminal liability issues. In addition, there are financial barriers that 
involve risking manpower, capital, and expertise on program, assuming that the rate of 
return will be worth taking the risk. Lenders consider the DoD market to be generally high 
risk, low profit, and non-competitive; therefore companies have issues securing the 
necessary investment funds from venture capitalists, and banks, especially if there is not 
already a signed contract in hand (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 45). Gansler et al. describe a 
report from the Institute for Defense Analysis which states that overall profits for the DoD 
were lower than private sector. Of note, in order for the DoD to leverage private sector 
expertise, profits from the DoD will need to be similar to the private sector in critical areas 
for emerging information technology to incentivize participation. Another barrier to DoD 
acquisition that Gansler et al. describe is intellectual property rights, especially considering 
that IP is the backbone of innovation in a market economy: Congress and the DoD have 
typically introduced strict IP requirements in government contracts that could result in 
sharing of proprietary information to competitors or requiring delivery of technical data 
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rights as part of source selection criteria, deterring commercial contractor participation. 
Unique security requirements with export policies and ITAR restrictions also discourages 
globalized commercial solutions (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 56). To circumvent these 
restrictive requirements, Gansler et al. explain that commercial companies are driven to 
improve their technologies by selling globally for R&D funding and investment first, and 
then to the government. Last, unique military specifications and oversight are a barrier to 
NDC participation. Military specific items, cost and pricing data, determinants of price 
reasonableness, audits, protests, domestic source preferences (Buy American Act and 
Berry Amendment), billing issues, and socioeconomic programs are all known barriers to 
nontraditional commercial participation (Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 63).   
Tools to encourage NDC participation in government contracts include the 
streamlined acquisition procedures of commercial items in FAR Part 12, market research 
to find readily available commercial alternatives, and rapid acquisition authority to “waive 
any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation that would unnecessarily impede the 
rapid acquisition and deployment of needed equipment to prevent combat fatalities” 
(Gansler et. al., 2013, p. 70). Also,  
OTA authority offers one of the best ways to access non-traditional 
contractors and was the vehicle that allowed the DoD to harness new 
technologies that it would not have been able to access through the 
traditional acquisition process. … The rollback in its use has kept an entire 
class of commercial contractors and entities from supporting the 
Department in its attempts to address acquisition challenges. (Gansler, 
2013, p. 67) 
Another tool to access NDCs is a government venture capital initiative to provide 
investment funding. For example, the CIA created In-Q-Tel to fund companies in the 
commercial market for information technology (IT) and security expertise and can then 
draw solutions into the government (Gansler et. al., 2013, p.74).  
I. MEASUREMENT VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY  
Measurement validity and reliability provide insight on research design and 
whether the model meaningfully tests the concepts it is meant to measure. Measurement 
validity looks at whether the scores depict the idea that the researcher intends to measure 
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(Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 529). Some common issues with measurement validity include 
the lack of shared standards, the relation between measurement validity and the 
disagreement in the meaning of concepts, measurements that vary in different contexts, 
and confusing language in measurement procedures (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 529). 
Ideally, scores measured should reflect the ideas in the matching concept and measure what 
it is meant to measure (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 530). In order to fully understand 
measurement validity, the following definitions are relevant:  
Level 1: Background Concept: Broad constellation of meanings and 
understandings associated with a given concept.   
Level 2: Systematized Concept: a specific formulation of a concept used by 
a given scholar or group of scholars; commonly involves an explicit 
definition.  
Level 3: Indicators: measures, the operational definitions employed in 
classifying cases.  
Level 4: Scores for the cases: generated by a particular indicator—include 
both numerical scores and the results of qualitative classification. (Adcock 
& Collier, 2001, p. 531) 
From these definitions, measurement is valid when level 4 scores, resulting from 
an indicator in level 3, can be meaningfully analyzed through the correct lens of the 
systematized concept the variable is designed to operationalize (Adcock & Collier, 2001, 
p. 531).  
Alternative types of validation include content validity, criterion validity, and 
construct validity. Content validity is how much the indicator represents the systematized 
concept being measured, criterion validity evaluates the scores of an indicator compared to 
other variable scores, and construct validity is whether the indicators conform to 
expectations of the interrelationship (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 537).  
Reliability estimates “evaluate the stability of measures, internal consistency of 
measurement instruments, and interrater reliability of instrument scores” (Kimerlin & 
Winterstein, 2008, p. 2276). The basis of reliability is on the assumption that measuring 
instruments have a true score if the measurement was accurate and the error in between 
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(Kimerlin & Winterstein, 2008, p. 2277). The reliability estimate in this research uses 
internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha (Kimerlin & Winterstein, 2008, p. 2277). 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology section explains the data collection from multiple sources and 
overall descriptive statistics of the data sample subset. Additionally, both the variable 
operationalization and model specification are detailed in this section. 
A. DATA AND SAMPLE 
This study provides a spend analysis and an empirical test of a proposed 
measurement scale for the innovative potential of firms under DoD OT agreements. The 
methodology of this study is designed to answer the research questions of whether the 
alternative metrics measure the innovative potential of OTs and have predictive power for 
classifying firms as nontraditional. The research question is investigated using data from 
multiple sources because there is not one complete source of data that contains all of the 
information required in this study. The government maintains award data in FPDS-NG, but 
does not contain all of the information such as consortium membership or firm type to fully 
utilization of OT agreements.   
1. FPDS-NG Data 
First, data was collected from FPDS–NG OT agreements from FY2005 to FY2018. 
FPDS-NG data must be reported by the DoD and federal agencies within thirty days of 
contract award and includes all post-award data and important pre-award acquisition 
decisions, such as the extent of competition and contract type.  FPDS-NG incorporates 
business data from Duns & Bradstreet, particularly linking business information to the 
DUNS number, used to search for vendor information in SAM API. FPDS-NG is the 
primary source of federal procurement data, reporting to the Office of the Integrated 
Acquisition Environment (IAE) and functioned by the General Services Administration 
(GSA). FPDS-NG is the system used to generate reports and analyses for the Executive 
Branch and Congress (GSA, 2019, p. 2).  
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2. Consortium Membership Data 
From the DoD OT agreements, consortium member lists were researched and the 
membership lists of companies, nonprofits, and academic institutions were compiled. If 
there was an OT award to a large consortium, the entire consortium membership list was 
found online or through personal contact, matched with SAM API, and added to the 
primary data set. Some of the consortia member lists included the business classifications 
into large or small business, non-profit, or academic and whether they fit the binary 
statutory definition of a nontraditional defense contractor.  
3. System for Award Management Application Programming Interface  
The vendors from FPDS-NG DoD OT agreements were combined with the 
consortium member list and matched with the System for Award Management (SAM) API 
with matching DUNS numbers. Any data fields with unclear multiple matches were not 
used in analysis.  
4. Bloomberg Government Data  
The Bloomberg Government data used in the discussion chapter was shared from a 
federal market analyst in their most recent data report dated March 2019 from Bloomberg 
Government (C. Cornillie, personal communication, August 5, 2019). Bloomberg 
Government maintains their own proprietary data source on Government awards and firm 
characteristics for analytic reports and for contractor knowledge. Bloomberg is a global 
company with the primary capability of data collection and analytics through innovative 
technology and reports. Bloomberg Government has two markets, one for government 
affairs and the other for government contracting. The government contracting market 
provides data and information for the contractor side of federal procurement and analyze 




5. Data Sample 
In the data sample, there were 437 observations, 355 of which were classified as 
nontraditional defense contractors under statutory definition. This calculates to 19% 
traditional and 81% nontraditional vendors. Even using multiple sources of data, it was not 
reasonable to gain access to all firms involved with OT agreements within the DoD. Over 
5,000 firms were identified for this research but after restricting to firms that contained all 
data fields, the data subset was reduced. The data subset was further reduced to 437 after 
data fields such as total obligations contained 0s, because calculations such as compound 
annual growth rate would not have numerical meaning. Even with the restriction of data, 
the sample subset was large enough to be representative of the general population of firms.  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the breakdown of contractor classifications in the data 
sample, divided by traditional contractor status and nontraditional defense contractor 
status. From the figures, it is evident that the data sample contains traditional contractors 
that are primarily academia members and large businesses. Figure 2, on the other hand, 
shows that the nontraditional defense contractors from the data sample are a majority of 
small businesses.  
 
Figure 1. Traditional Contractor Classifications in Data Sample 
Traditional Contractor 
Academic Non-Profit Large Business Small Business Unclassified/Other
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Figure 2. Nontraditional Defense Contractor Classifications in Data 
Sample 
Table 9 highlights the data sample contractor classifications numerically, rather 
than in pie chart style above. As mentioned, the majority of the data subset contains small 
businesses classified as nontraditional, 297 of the 437 firms. 
Table 9. Data Sample Contractor Classifications 
 Nontraditional  Traditional  
Academic  11 7 
Nonprofit  3 9 
Large Business  21 23 
Small Business  297 13 
Unclassified/Other  23 30 
Total  355 82 
 
The data sample descriptive statistics are detailed in Table 10. The minimum 
distance to a tech-hub was calculated in miles, but was also log-transformed for skewness, 
explaining the corresponding mean and standard deviation. The nontraditional status is a 
Nontraditional Contractor
Academic Non-Profit Large Business Small Business Unclassified/Other
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binary variable, therefore the mean of 0.81 reflects that the data sample contained more 
nontraditional defense contractors (binary value 1), versus traditional contractors. The total 
DoD obligations to a firm was calculated in millions, a more reasonable scale for the high 
dollar values in the data set.  
Table 10. Data Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev.  
Nontraditional Status  0.812357 0.3908743 
Distance to Tech-hub 4.143765 1.508657 
CAGR -0.0921841 .4982487 
Total Obligations 1.10e+08 5.92e+08 
  
B. VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
This research measures the three proposed metrics using FPDS-NG and SAM API 
data, and conducts a logistic regression model to test how the variables effect the 
classification of the vendor as traditional or nontraditional. The multi-item scale of these 
alternative metrics has not been empirically examined. A summary of the 
operationalization of variables is detailed in this section.  
The Govini (n.d.) report investigates alternative ways to measure innovative 
potential, scrutinizing the current definition of a nontraditional defense contractor as not 
specific enough and not necessarily correlating to an innovative vendor that is not 
incentivized to work with the DoD. The Govini report recommends three metrics to assess 
whether the increased use and authority of OTs is achieving the goal of capitalizing on the 




(1) Nontraditional Defense Contractor: The variable of whether or not an entity 
is defined as a nontraditional defense contractor is binary 
Either the company fits the nontraditional definition under 48 CFR 212.001, or it 
does not. This research is interested in the factors that influence whether a contractor or 
company is considered “innovative” or nontraditional—this test will see how variables 
affect the classification of a company as innovative.  
(2) Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 
The DoD is encouraged to repeat research and development business with vendors 
that demonstrate innovation; therefore more innovative vendors would ideally have an 
increased sum of total obligations and compound annual growth rate. The compound 
annual growth rate from DoD contracts was calculated from FPDS-NG and SAM data from 
obligations FY2012–FY2018. CAGRs from firms with an initial total obligation of 0 in the 
first year were not able to be calculated and therefore eliminated from the subset.  
(3) Sum of Total Obligations  
The sum of total obligations was calculated from FY2012–FY2018. The sum of 
total obligations was scaled to millions of dollars for a more appropriate scale for the high 
data values.  
(4) Distance to the Nearest Tech-Hub  
In order to determine the tech-hubs, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission researched the high-tech sectors in the United States defined as “industries 
that employ a high concentration of employees in science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics occupations and the production of goods and services advancing the use of 
electronic and computer-based production methods” (EEOC, 2014, p. 1). The top high-
tech geographic areas are listed in Table 11.  
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Table 11. Top High-Tech Geographic Areas. Adapted from EEOC 
(2014). 
Area Total High-Tech Employment  
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-
PA 
363,444 




San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  257,349 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 224,533 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 197,046 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 189,615 




Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 128,296 
 
Latitude and longitudinal coordinates were found for each of the 10 city high-tech-
hubs. This list of cities was compared to other non-government sources to find similarities. 
When compared with CompTIA’s 2018 Tech Town Index, which ranked cities with 
demand for tech workers, cost of living, number of open IT positions, and projected job 
growth, the majority of cities in the EEOC report matched with the index (CompTIA, 
2018). 
Since many companies leading in their field of expertise are located in areas 
surrounded by businesses, universities, and institutions for certain technology, such as 
Silicon Valley, Boston, or Pittsburgh, the shorter distance to a tech-hub should correlate to 
a more innovative firm. The place of performance of the contract zip code was a tested 
assumption to generally equal the same value as the vendor office zip code in SAM. This 
vendor place of performance location was converted to latitude and longitude coordinate 
pairs. The coordinate pairs of the 10 cities in the EEOC report table were also found. The 
distances between each vendor place of performance and each tech-hub city location was 
found using the Spherical Law of Cosines formula and calculated in miles.  
The Spherical Law of Cosines was used to calculate the distance between two pairs 
of coordinates, from the vendor’s place of performance to the nearest tech-hub.  
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𝑑𝑑 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜑𝜑1 ∗  𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜑𝜑2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜑𝜑1 ∗  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜑𝜑2 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎⧍𝜆𝜆) ∗ 𝑅𝑅 
      𝝀𝝀 = longitude of coordinate pairs 
𝜑𝜑1 = 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐 1 
In Microsoft Excel, the minimum function was used to find the minimum distance between 
the place of performance and the closest tech-hub city in the unit of miles. This was the 
minimum distance to a tech-hub used in analysis. The distance to a tech-hub was log-
transformed for skewness.  
(5) Membership in a Consortium 
Membership in a consortium is seen as an innovative strength since consortiums 
collaborate with large and small businesses, non-profits, and academic institutions centered 
around technical areas of expertise. Membership lists of consortiums which the DoD has 
OT agreements were found online or through personal communication and compiled.  
C. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
In order to answer the research questions, this study used a logit model—or 
logistical regression—in order to model dichotomous outcome variables (UCLA, n.d.). 
Logistic regression uses the log odds modeled as a linear combination of the predictor 
variables, which in this case are the minimum distance to a tech-hub, compound annual 
growth rate, and the sum of total obligations (UCLA, n.d.). Logistic regression predicts 
and explains a binary categorical variable (nontraditional defense contractor: yes or no) 
and estimates the relationship between the dependent variable and a set of nonmetric 
independent variables (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 317). The logistic 
regression model is widely used because it does not require the assumptions of multivariate 
normality and equal covariance, as required in discriminant analysis. Also, logistic 
regression has forthright statistical tests and a range of diagnostics (Hair et al., 2010, p. 
320). The objective of logistic regression is to identify the “independent variables that 
impact group membership in the dependent variable and establish a classification system 
based on the logistic model for determining group membership” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 320).  
The model estimates the variables in the following form:   
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𝑌𝑌1 =  𝑋𝑋1 + 𝑋𝑋2 + 𝑋𝑋3 + ⋯+ 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 
(binary nonmetric)  (nonmetric and metric).  
The resulting outputs of this model are logit values and odds ratios (Hair et al., 2010, p. 
320). The model is determined to be statistically significant comparatively to a null model. 
Once determined to be statistically significant, the confusion matrix quantifies the 
predictive accuracy (Hair et al., 2010, p. 322).  
1. Sample Size 
The sample size was considered relevant in this model because if the sample is too 
small, sampling error would be too high and invalidate the results (Hair et al., 2010, p. 
322). With the combined FPDS-NG, consortium member list, and corresponding SAM 
data, there were over 5,000 data entries; however, some of the entries did not have every 
data field filled in. Those data entries with missing cells were not included in analysis. In 
addition, those data entries with clearly inaccurate data, such as misclassifications or all 0s 
in obligations were eliminated due to being unreliable or useable to calculate compound 
annual growth rate. Even without the missing value cells, the observed sample size was 
over 400, which meets the Hosmer–Lemeshow recommended sample sizes for maximum 
likelihood estimation technique greater than 400. This means the size is appropriate to 
support estimation of the logistic model (Hair et al., 2010, p. 322). The sample sizes for 
each dependent variable is recommended to be at least 10 observations per estimated 
parameter, which is also available in this data set (Hair, 2010, pp.322).  
The formula shows the model estimation. The coefficients for the independent 
variable of nontraditional status are estimated with odds values for the four dependent 
variables (Hair et al., 2010, p. 326). In this research, the log odds value is displayed in the 
table of logistic regression results.  
𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 �
𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒
� = 𝑝𝑝0 +  𝑝𝑝1𝑋𝑋1 + ⋯+ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 
The goodness of fit formula for pseudo R2 is shown. A perfect model fit has a R2 logit of 1 
(Hair et al., 2010, p. 327). 
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2. Cross Validation  
In order to validate the results and ensure external and internal validity, random 
numbers were assigned to data fields and the logistic model was reapplied to cross-validate 
the predictive accuracy (Hair et al., 2010, p. 333). Fifteen percent of the data was withheld 
and used for cross-validation of the logistic regression model to validate performance of 
the model and assess how it generalizes to the population.  
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2 =  
−2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 −  (−2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛)
−2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
 
3. Interaction Variable 
The advantage of adding an interaction variable to a logistic regression model is 
that it provides more information of the effect of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable based on different levels of another dependent variable, which if correlated, could 
demonstrate an amplifying effect as compared to the separated dependent variables. The 
interaction variable overall is a manipulated variable that assesses the effects of Z at 
different levels of X from the equation (Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch, & McClelland, 2013) 
For the interaction variable in this model, the sum of obligations and compound annual 
growth rate were mean centered and were not log-transformed for skewness. The sum of 
obligations was also scaled to millions per unit for relevance of the data.  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏 + 𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋 + 𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋 
The Govini (n.d.) study theorizes that CAGR and the sum of obligations from DoD 
contracts are closely related and if combined into one variable, could have an amplifying 
effect for “innovative force” (p. 7). Overall, it is hypothesized that if a vendor has both a 
high compound annual growth rate and a large sum of total obligations, mass and 
acceleration of the company, then it would be considered to have high innovative potential.  
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IV. RESULTS   
A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS  
A logistic regression of nontraditional status on four dependent variables (distance 
to a tech-hub, consortium membership, CAGR, and total obligations) fit significantly better 
to the data than a null model 𝜒𝜒2(4) = 32.01,𝑝𝑝 <  .01) and correctly predicted 
nontraditional status for 79.6% of vendors based off pseudo R. Table 12 displays the 
estimations of the model. We are unable to conclude, based upon the results of the chi-
square testing of distributions that the data subset of 437 firms, traditional and 
nontraditional differ significantly from those in a larger random sample or generalized 
population.  
Table 12 includes the log odds coefficient and p-values for both model 1 and 
model 2. Model 1 is the logit model including the original dependent variables of the 
minimum distance to a tech-hub, mean centered sum of total obligations, and mean 
centered compound annual growth rates. Model 2 reevaluates the logistic regression 
including the interaction variable between the sum of total obligations and compound 
annual growth rate. From the output, Model 2 with the interaction variable was more 
significant than Model 1 and had a deviance of 23.57 for Model 1 with three degrees of 
freedom compared to a deviance of 14.39 for Model 2 with one additional degree of 
freedom. The deviances show the improvement level of the model for prediction 
nontraditional defense contractor status. 
Table 12. Logistic Regression Results  
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Estimate (log 
odds coefficient)  
P(>|z|) Estimate P(>|z|) 
Intercept  1.0170557 0.01545* 0.454834 0.337590 
Log Min  0.1469827 0.14769 0.121040 0.246839 
Sum centered  -0.0018664 0.00825** -0.008481 0.000381*** 
CAGR Centered  0.5771126 0.05739 5.713344 0.001251** 
Interaction    0.050195 0.002721** 
Note: n = 437;  *p < .01, **p < 0.001, ***p< 0. 
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Table 13 includes the confusion matrix which quantifies the prediction odds of the 
logit model. From the results, the model is able to classify a nontraditional defense 
contractor more effectively than a traditional contractor. The results also show the 
imbalance of the data sample with the majority of the data samples as nontraditional 
defense contractors versus traditional.  
Table 13. Confusion Matrix  
Prediction Traditional  Nontraditional  
Traditional 5 0 
Nontraditional 18 65 
 
 
𝝌𝝌𝟐𝟐(𝟑𝟑) = 𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑.𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒 𝒑𝒑 <.𝟎𝟎𝟑𝟑  
 
Table 14 shows the correlation matrix, with the pairwise correlations between 
variables. Overall, the correlation matrix depicts the relationships between variables, 
whether they move together and the nature of its linear relationship.  
Table 14. Correlation Matrix  
 Nontraditional  Tech-hub Total Oblig.  CAGR 
Nontraditional  1.0000    
Tech-hub 0.1703 1.0000   
Total Oblig. -0.1637 -0.0998 1.0000  
CAGR 0.0559 0.0628 0.04768 1.0000 
 
Figure 3 is the graph of the two-way interaction variable between the total sum of 
obligations and compound annual growth rate. This shows the amplifying effect of RDT&E 
obligations on CAGR in predicting the classification of a firm as nontraditional. One 
standard deviation below and above the mean are included because it shows the higher than 
average obligations effect and the lower than average obligation effect on CAGR in 
predicting nontraditional contractor status. The higher the CAGR of a firm, the more likely 
the firm will be a nontraditional contractor. Firms with high CAGR and total obligations 
have higher probability of being a nontraditional contractor, conforming with the Govini 
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(n.d.) explanation of a highly innovative force. The lower than average DoD obligations 
with a low CAGR had a higher probability of classification as a nontraditional defense 
contractor. Low CAGR combined with high total obligations had a higher probability of 
being classified a traditional contractor.  
 
Figure 3. Two-Way Interaction Variable 
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1. Scale Reliability Coefficient   
The scale reliability coefficient, the measure of internal consistency determining 
how closely related a set of items are as a group was found to be 0.0843. This value is very 
low, meaning the measure of internal consistency is not a good fit or reliable. With the low 
scale reliability, it is worth examining the measurement validation of this logistic 
regression model. It is important to ensure that the model tests the concepts it is meant to 
measure. There could be issues with measurements that vary in different contexts, such as 
the compound annual growth of an entity, using only DoD obligations, not the entity’s 
overall financial status. Also, the indicator of distance of a tech-hub, could not be an 
indicator of innovation of a nontraditional defense contractor due to the increased 
communication access. Distance to a tech-hub city may no longer be necessary or a valid 
indicator. There is also the possibility that key elements could be missing or that the 
indicators fail to capture the full content of the desired systematized concept (Adcock & 
Collier, 2010, p. 539). 
B. SPEND ANALYSIS  
The results are from the FPDS-NG OT data spend analysis. The first figure shows 
that there is a significant increase in OT agreements federally from FY2005–FY2018. This 
increased use goes hand in hand with the widened latitude of OT authority with the 
NDAAs, particularly with the NDAA FY2016 allowing prototyping OTs throughout the 
DoD. In addition, comparing the new awards compared to all actions shows the majority 
of actions are modifications rather than new awards, similar to in traditional FAR-based 
procurement FPDS-NG data.  
Figure 4 illustrates the significant increase in new OT new agreements (without 
modifications) in the DoD comparatively to all federal agreements. The main increase of 
OT use begins with the FY2016 NDAA authorizing prototyping to the DoD.  
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Figure 4. OT Agreements (Awards and Modifications)  
Figure 5 shows that the Army has the highest OT obligation amounts, increasing 
significantly in recent years. From the DoD departments, the Air Force is second in OT 
obligations, followed by the Navy. The Transportation Security Administration and Office 
of Procurement Operations (OPO) are included in this figure and have comparable OT 
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Figure 5. DoD OT New Agreements vs. All Federal Agencies  
Figure 7 uses the same OT obligation data as Figure 6 but removes the Army’s OT 
obligations to achieve a better scale for the other agencies. From this graph, there is a 
general upward trend of OT use. In FY2016, the Air Force awarded a $99 million indefinite 
delivery indefinite quantity OT agreement for open system initiatives and prototype 
projects. The OT was issued by the Air Force Research Lab to SOSSEC, Inc., a consortium 
located in New Hampshire. In FY2016 alone, there were 42 modifications for supplemental 
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Figure 7. Sum of OT Obligated Amounts 
Table 15 identifies the companies with the highest base and option year OT 
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Table 15. DoD FPDS-NG data FY2014–FY2018: New OT 
Agreements—Highest Base and All Options Values 
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Since the majority of the highest value OT agreements are issued by the Army, the 
Air Force and Navy OT agreements are shown in Table 15.  
Table 16. Air Force OT Base and All Options, FY2014–FY2018 
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Table 17. Navy OT Base and All Options, FY2014–FY2018   




































































2018 $750,000 Navy 
 
The Army, Navy, and Air Force all have OT participation from Advanced 
Technology International. The Air Force’s OTs are primarily for rocket propulsion system 
prototypes. The Navy has the lowest dollar value OT agreements overall.  
Tables 18 through 20 are created from the same FPDS-NG data from FY2014–
FY2019 but are based on the total obligated amounts not the base and option years. This 
shows the actual amount of funding placed on the agreements and the requirement. There 
is a difference with the obligated amounts because where the Army had the largest 
indefinite vehicle OTs for use, the Air Force has actually obligated more money on the OT 
agreements.  
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Table 18. OTs Highest Obligations, FY2014–FY2018 
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Since the majority of the highest OT obligations are from the Air Force, the Army 
and Navy’s OTs are detailed in Tables 19 and 20.  
Table 19. Army OT Obligations, FY2014–FY2018   
Vendor  Vendor 
Location  









































Table 20. Navy OT Obligations, FY2014–FY2018  
Vendor Vendor 
Location  
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Consortiums demonstrate innovative potential for the DoD due to the collaboration 
of businesses, nonprofits and academic institutions in specified technology areas. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the 39 new OT agreements to consortiums in 
FY2014–FY2018. There were a total of 215 new OT agreements, 18% of which were to 
consortiums rather than individual firms. Although the number of agreements to 
consortiums was in the minority, the values of the OT agreements were among the highest. 
With the multiyear base and all options values from FY2014–FY2018, OT agreements to 
consortiums account for $42.2 billion out of $47.1 billion. This is 89% of the base and 
option year funding to consortiums. Using the actual obligations, $56.5 million of 
obligations out of $954 million were to consortiums, only 6%. This data reflects that large 
indefinite vehicle OT agreements were given to consortiums, but the majority of OTs with 
products are to individual entities. 
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V. DISCUSSION  
Analyzing multiple sources of OT data helps policy-makers in making informed 
and educated decisions and illustrates trends for the increasingly utilized acquisition tool 
of an OT. Being able to measure innovative potential of companies is critical to the DoD’s 
ability to advance with innovation through prototyping and follow-on production with 
companies with expertise and knowledge not currently being tapped into by the DoD. If 
the current binary statutory definition of a NDC does not correctly classify those companies 
the DoD aims to leverage, then the DoD is missing out on opportunities to fully leverage 
the special authority of an OT. In addition, this study helps provide initial information on 
the firms receiving DoD OT agreements in order to identify the best methods and 
incentives to encourage NDCs to work with the government utilizing OTs and the common 
characteristics and organizational structure of the contractors receiving DoD OT 
agreements. In today’s complex security environment of rapid technological change, 
companies that are postured for fast technological adoption and innovative prototypes are 
most relevant and critical in DoD acquisition.  
The minimum distance to a tech-hub resulted in a relatively low positive 
relationship, meaning the closer to a tech-hub location, the more likely the vendor to be 
classified as a nontraditional defense contractor. The relationship may not have been a 
strong of a predictor of innovation because the minimum distance to a tech-hub may not 
be a reliable measure for innovation due to modern communications and ease of travel. As 
supported by the Gansler et al. (2013) report as well,  
for many companies, location matters less to their increasingly virtual and 
global workforce…This is equally true for small startups without the time 
or money to pursue work permits, but that do have access to shared virtual 
workspaces and overnight shipping…Many companies have found they can 
maintain around the clock progress on critical discoveries by handing off 
results across time zones as one shift leaves the lab and another arrives for 
work. (p. 17) 
In addition, the Govini report (n.d.) found that OTAs were focused in five cities, none of 
which were tech-hubs, because they were the consortium office location. Because of this, 
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this metric was not useful in the Govini report, but in this analysis, instead of using the 
consortium locations, the membership companies and their locations were used to assess 
distances to the nearest tech-hub. There was a negative relationship between the sum of 
total obligations and the probability of being classified as a nontraditional contractor. This 
means the higher the DoD obligations to the firm, the less likely the firm would be a 
nontraditional. If a firm has a high amount of DoD obligations, there is a higher likelihood 
they would be subject to higher CAS covered contracts and be a traditional contractor.  
From the FPDS-NG spend analysis of consortiums, the data mirrored the 
Bloomberg Government results with the top consortium management firms of ATI, 
Consortium Management Group, Inc., and the U.S. National Center for Manufacturing 
Sciences. Of note, however, is that the obligation rate is significantly lower than the base 
and option years for DoD OT agreements, showing that consortiums are more likely to be 
involved in indefinite vehicle OT agreements.  
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Figure 9. ATI Consortium. Source: C. Cornillie (email to author, 
August 5, 2019). 
In addition, the only consortium webpage to include more than just membership 
information was the National Spectrum Consortium. As shown in Figure 9, Bloomberg 
Government chart, the National Spectrum Consortium publishes which member company, 
nonprofit, or institution received the OT agreement and the associated dollar value. The 
majority of OT awards went to their members classified as NDCs, which emphasizes the 
importance of ensuring that vendors are being correctly classified as NDCs to utilize their 
innovative potential.  
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Figure 10. OTs to Nontraditional Defense Contractors, Source: 
C. Cornillie (email to author, August 5, 2019)   
While a large amount of OT funding is going to large defense contractors, it is 
important to note that they could have the OT agreements if they have participation from a 
nontraditional contractor or subcontractor to a significant extent, again showing the 
importance of appropriate definitions and metrics for nontraditional vendors and 
innovation potential.  
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Figure 11. Defense Companies in OTs, Source: C. Cornillie (email to 
author, August 5, 2019). 
The innovation metrics proposed by Govini (n.d.) are alternatives that could 
correlate to whether the definition of a nontraditional contractor is measuring the 
innovative potential aimed for in OT agreements. In the Innovation Management 
Measurement article, measuring innovation tends to focus on output measures and research 
and development measurement (Adams, Bessant, & Phelps, 2006, p. 38). The article 
recommends developing innovation metrics by evaluating seven innovation management 
processes including “inputs management, knowledge management, innovation strategy, 
organizational culture and structure, portfolio management, project management, and 
commercialization” (Adams et al., 2006, p. 21). There are currently no standardized 
innovation metrics, however commonly used internal metrics correspond to results such as 
annual research and development budgets, sales of new products, the number of patents, 
new product generation versus altering existing products, and active innovation projects in 
a portfolio within a company.  
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Other metrics for innovation could be market share in the science technology markets, 
which is publicly available information. Of note, it is important to consider that the 
characteristics that make a firm innovative are not necessarily the same characteristics that 
make a firm successful. The intent behind prototyping and research is to try new ideas. 
There needs to be a way to assess and identify firms with the innovative potential and to 
not consider a them failure if a company enters into an OT agreement and does not reach 
the entirety of goals or mission requirements but could still add value to partnering with 




The research question aimed to answer if four alternative metrics—of compound 
annual growth rate, total DoD obligations, distance to a tech-hub, and membership in a 
consortium—measure the innovative potential of NDCs and have predictive power for 
classifying firms under the current binary NDC classification. This question was answered 
through conducing a logistic regression model on archival FPDS-NG data and producing 
a model more statistically significant than a null. The model was not considered 
particularly reliable in the definition sense of Kimerlin and Winterstein’s (2008) 
explanation of the consistency of a measure to be reproduced, reflected by the low value 
of the scale reliability coefficient, however the model did assess the predictive power of 
the proposed scale and the relationships between the items in the scale. Being able to 
measure and quantify the innovative potential of firms will help the DoD to access 
innovation for research and prototyping by being able to tailor the OT special authority 
towards those firms that might otherwise not partner with the DoD. The research questions 
are specific and narrow in view, but provide an initial understanding of the broader question 
of whether OTs provide an advantage to innovative technological advancements through 
NDCs and the best methods to reach and encourage these contractors to partner with the 
DoD.   
Overall, background and initial information is provided to understand how OTs 
provide an advantage to innovative technological advancements through nontraditional 
defense contractors. The DoD prioritizes leveraging rapid technological advancements by 
integrating emerging commercial technology solutions into military capabilities. The data 
used in this research is unclassified FPDS-NG data on OTs from FY2005 through FY2018. 
From the CRS report, the most authoritative contract data source is FPDS-NG for OT 
prototypes and production; however, research OT obligations along with grants and 
cooperative agreements are typically recorded in a different system called Defense 
Assistance Awards Data System (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, pp. 10–11). The CRS report 
also highlights that all OT data will be reported in FPDS-NG in late 2019, which will 
provide for a more accurate analysis of OT use (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 11). This 
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research does not include any data from the Defense Assistance Awards Data System. All 
data, including FPDS-NG data, has imperfections, incomplete elements, and certain 
limitations by nature. FPDS-NG data in particular can have up to a 90-day delay in 
uploading and updating information regardless of fiscal year (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, p. 
37). In the Prototype OT FPDS-NG data, there are inconsistencies and conflicting data 
inputs due to two related fields, one titled “Fiscal Year” and the other “Contract Fiscal 
Year” to identify when an agreement was signed or modified (Schwartz & Peters, 2019, 
p. 37). These two similar data inputs could result in differing analyses in drawing 
conclusions in prototype OT data. Another limitation of the data is that the compound 
annual growth rate could not be calculated for any of the vendors with the initial obligation 
of 0. One last limitation of the data is that during the SAM API process, there were firms 
with multiple matches, and therefore could not be confidently retrieved with the correct 
data fields for analysis. All of the SAM multiple matches were removed from the data 
sample. Initially the data sample consisted of over 5000 firms, but after scrubbing the data 
for missing fields, incomplete or inaccurate data, the sample was reduced to 437. This data 
sample is large enough to be considered representative of firms in the general population.  
Some areas for future research include researching different metrics for innovative 
potential, the benefits of OT agreements versus other nontraditional contracting methods 
through successful prototyping, and analysis of weapon system programs resulting from 
awards to consortiums. Congress has increased reporting and notification requirements in 
the FY2019 defense authorization and appropriations legislation; therefore, more data and 
information will be publicly available for research, which will allow for more in-depth 
research and understanding of the utilization of OT agreements and access to NDCs 
(Govini, n.d., p. 14). 
73 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, R., Bessant, J., & Phelps, R. (2006). Innovation management measurement: A 
review. International Journal of Management Reviews, 8(1): 21–47. Retrieved 
from https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2370.2006.00119.x  
Adcock, R., & Collier, D. (2001). Measurement validity: A shared standard for 
qualitative and quantitative research. American Political Science Review, 95, 529–
546. Retrieved from https://www-cambridge-org.libproxy.nps.edu  
Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations. (2017). Section 
809 Panel Interim Report. Retrieved from https://section809panel.org/ 
AFWERX. (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.afwerx.af.mil/  
Bloomberg Government. (n.d.). From intelligence to influence. Retrieved November 27, 
2019, from https://about.bgov.com/ 
CAS Applicability, 48 C.F.R. § 9903.201-1 (2018). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/48/9903.201-1  
CompTIA. (2018, October 23). Tech Town, USA: 20 cities IT pros will want to call 
home [Blog post]. Retrieved from https://www.aitp.org/blog/aitp-blog/2018/10/
23/tech-town-usa-20-cities-it-pros-will-want-to-call-home/ 
Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). China military power: Modernizing a force to fight 
and win. Retrieved from https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/
Military%20Power%20Publications/
China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (2014). Diversity in high tech. 
Washington, DC: EEOC. Retrieved from https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
reports/hightech/ 
Gansler, J.S., Greenwalt, W.C., & Lucyshyn, W. (2013). Non-traditional commercial 
defense contractors. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a613239.pdf  
General Services Administration (GSA). (2019). FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual 
Retrieved from: https://www.fpds.gov/downloads/Manuals/
FPDS_NG_Users_Manual_V1.4.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2005). Future combat systems challenges and 
prospects for success (GAO-05-442T). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-05-442T 
74 
Government Accountability Office. (2016). Federal acquisitions: Use of ‘Other 
Transaction’ agreements limited and mostly for research and development 
activities (GAO 16–209). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/
674534.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2017a). DoD is taking steps to address challenges 
faced by certain companies. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/
674534.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2017b). Weapon systems: Prototyping has benefited 
acquisition programs, but more can be done to support innovation initiatives 
(GAO-17-309). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685478.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2018, May 31). Decision—Matter of Oracle 
America, Inc. (GAO B-416061). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/products/B-
416061 
Government Accountability Office. (2019, April 4). Decision—Matter of MD 
Helicopters, Inc. (GAO-B-417379). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/
products/B-417379 
Govini. (n.d.). Evaluating the innovative potential of other transaction authority 
investments. Retrieved March 27, 2019, from https://www.govini.com/home/
insights/  
Hair, J.F., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J., & Anderson, R.E. (2010). Multivariate data analysis 
(7th ed). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Halchin, L. E. (2011). Other Transaction (OT) Authority (CRS Report RL34760). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Kendall, F. (2015, April 9). Implementation directive for Better Buying Power 3.0—
Achieving dominant capabilities through technical excellence and innovation. 
Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]). 
Kimerlin, C.L., & Winterstein, A.G. (2008). Validity and reliability of measurement 
instruments used in research: Research fundamentals. American Society of Health 
System Pharmacists, Inc., 65(1), 2276–2284.  
Maucione, S. (2018, July 17). As OTAs grow, traditional contractors are reaping the 
benefits. Retrieved from https://federalnewsnetwork.com/contracting/2018/07/as-
otas-grow-prime-contractors-are-reaping-the-benefits/ 
75 
Office of the Inspector General. (2002). Statement for the record, Robert J. Lieberman, 
Deputy inspector general, Department of Defense, to the Subcommittee on 
Technology and Procurement Policy House Committee on Government Reform on 
the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) of 2002 [Memorandum]. Retrieved 
from http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1116572/statement-for-the-
record-robert-j-lieberman-deputy-inspector-general-department/  
Office of the President of the United States. (2018). National defense strategy. Retrieved 
from https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment. (n.d.). Other 
Transactions Authority (OTA) statutory timeline. Retrieved July 1, 2019, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/docs/OTA Statutory Timeline.docx 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD(AT&L). (2017). Report to Congress: An assessment of cost-sharing in 
other transactions agreements for prototype projects. Washington, DC: 




Pandit, K., & Marmanis, H. (2008). Spend analysis: The window into strategic 
sourcing. Ft. Lauderdale, FL: J. Ross Publishing.  
Richtner, A., Brattstrom, A., Frishammer, J., Bjork, J., & Magnusson, M. (2017, 
September 12). Creating better innovation measurement practices. MIT Sloan 
Management Review. Retrieved from https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/creating-
better-innovation-measurement-practices/ 
Schwartz, M., & Peters, H. M. (2019). Department of Defense use of other transaction 
authority: Background, analysis, and issues for Congress (CRS Report R45521). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45521  
Senate Armed Services Committee. (2017). Advanced policy questions for Ellen Lord: 
Nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. Retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Lord_APQs_07-18-17.pdf 
Slaughter, R. (2019). Space Pitch Day—And the other 11 upcoming Air Force Pitch 
events. Retrieved from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/space-pitch-day-other-11-
upcoming-air-force-events-robert-slaughter/ 
Smith, G., Drezner, J., & Lachow, I. (2002). Assessing the use of “other transactions” 
authority for prototype projects. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Retrieved from 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB375.html 
76 
Spiller, S.A., Fitzsimons, G.J., Lynch, J.G. & McClelland, G. H., (2013). Spotlights, 
floodlights, and the magic number zero: Simple effects tests in moderated 
regression. Journal of Marketing Research, 50 (2), 277-288. Retrieved from 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/42002773  
UCLA. (n.d.). Introduction to SAS. New Test: Command to compute new test. Retrieved 
October 1, 2019, from https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/dae/logistic-regression/ 
Under Secretary of Defense. (2017). Department of Defense financial management 
regulation volume 2B: “Budget formulation and presentation.” Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)). (2018). 
Other Transactions (OT) guide for prototype projects. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense. Retrieved from https://aaf.dau.edu/ot-guide/ 
U.S. Congress. (2008). Other transaction authority: Flexibility at the expense of 
accountability? Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology. 







INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
